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ONE WAY TO BE BORN?
LEGISLATIVE INACTION
AND THE POSTHUMOUS CHILD
KARIN MIKA* AND BONNIE HURST**
A Georgetown University professor stood at a blackboard and began
writing formulas: the symbols represented ten different ways of making
babies.'
The fourth formula that he chalked up read XM & YD by AI
with Gestation M, mean[t] that a married woman is artificially
inseminated by a male donor's sperm. The fifth formula, XD &
YM by IVF with Gestation M, meant that the beginnings of life
could be created through the uniting in a laboratory dish (in-vitro
fertilization) of a woman's donated egg and a married man's
sperm. Capron's final version - X1 & Y2 by IVF or NaturalIAl
w/embryo flushing with Gestation 3 and Social Parents 4 & 5 -
outlined how a baby could theoretically have five different
"parents.")2
The reason the professor resorted to such formulas is that the medical
field is creating concepts of birth and parenthood more quickly "than the
standard English vocabulary can define them."3 This is much different
than what occurs in the legal profession. A professor at Yale College of
Law pinpointed the crucial distinction between medicine and law when
he said "the medical profession looks forward, while the legal profession
gazes backward."4 In a vivid example of these differing approaches, he
wrote:
If a British barrister of two hundred years ago were suddenly
to come alive in an American court-room, he would feel intellec-
tually at home.... Imagine, by contrast, a British surgeon of two
hundred years ago plopped into a modem hospital operating
* Assistant Director of Legal Writing, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A.,
Baldwin-Wallace College, 1986; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 1991.
** J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 1995.
1. Otto Friedrich, "... A Legal Moral, Social Nightmare..."; Society seeks to define the
problems of the birth revolution, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of the New Reproductive
Technologies, 6 WHITIER L. REv. 789, 789 (1984).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
room. He would literally understand less of what was going on
than would any passer-by brought in from the street at random.'
While this distinction between medicine and law is sometimes
inevitable because the law can merely respond to, rather than predict the
developments of medicine,6 this lag has often been inordinate and has
often forced courts "to confront new situations that fail to fit neatly"
within the confines of the statutes created to deal with prior fact
situations.7 The lag, then, has caused more legal complexities than
might otherwise have occurred with prompt legislative action!
One area in which medical technology is sure to yield vast legal
complexities is the issue of the posthumously conceived child-a child
conceived after the death of one or both parents, whether by surrogate,
or test tube. Because of the advanced technology enabling more
individuals to preserve reproductive cells, the legal status of the
posthumous child is likely to become a major legal issue that should
promptly be confronted by legislation.
This Article will argue that the posthumous child and the rights and
responsibilities relating to such a child are directly related to the
fundamental right to procreate. It will argue that legislation must
necessarily incorporate that right in sorting out issues related to the
posthumous child and deviate from the standard principles of contract
law which have been applied in the past. In reaching its conclusion, this
Article will describe the history of artificial insemination and the
procedure itself. It will then discuss case law addressing legitimacy issues
concerning artificial insemination children and the Supreme Court's
delineation of the fundamental right to procreate. The Article will
demonstrate how the series of "procreation" Supreme Court cases and
interpretive federal decisions have validated choice of reproductive
method as part and parcel of the fundamental right to procreate, and
how contract and real property principles have been and are inadequate
when dealing with issues concerning the posthumous child. The Article
will discuss current legislation respecting artificial insemination and the
posthumous child, and it will then argue that such legislation is
5. Id.
6. Hutton Brown, et. al, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and
Birth, 39 VAND. L. REv. 597, 603 (1986).
7. Id. at 602.
8. For example, abortion was not a new issue when Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
was decided; however, in Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court was essentially asked to create
legislative guidelines for a medical technique. Twenty-three years after Roe, abortion is still
a controversial issue that legislation has not even remotely cleared up.
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inadequate and does not take into consideration current technological
realities or even the current judicial stance on the right to procreate.
Finally, this Article will suggest that legislatures, having had years of
notice, must act promptly in addressing the realities of the posthumous
child and directly confront issues relating to nonmainstream family
situations.
I. HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Artificial insemination is not a new procedure, but rather centuries
old as relating to inseminating animals.' "The first recorded successful
human artificial insemination was accomplished in England in 17-
70... by a surgeon named John Hunter."1 It was not accomplished in
the United States until 1866 when a doctor named Marion Simms
successfully artificially inseminated a woman." In the same year, an
Italian scientist, Montegazza, found that human sperm could survive
freezing and suggested that frozen sperm banks be used by widows
whose husbands were killed at war. 2
The process of using frozen sperm to inseminate artificially was
unsuccessful until 1949 when it was found that the addition of a small
amount of glycerol before freezing would increase the sperm's chances
of survival.3 In the 1960's, freezing, or cryopreservation, of sperm was
made accessible to some astronauts so that even if space travel were to
injure their reproductive systems, the astronauts could still father healthy
children using their stored sperm. 4 "During the Vietnam War, soldiers
sent frozen sperm back to their wives in the United States so," if the
soldiers were injured in the war, they could be fathers when they
returned home. 5
The current technology of cryopreservation and sperm preservation
requires that sperm must be frozen and stored in a tank filled with liquid
9. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law
of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J. OF LAW & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986-87). Artificial
insemination has been used primarily to inseminate cattle.
10. Id.
11. Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemination,
22 HoFSTRA L. REv. 521, 525 (1993-94). Because of the community's deep-seated religious
and moral reservations about a woman conceiving a child unnaturally, Dr. Simms' actions were
met with disdain. Based on this negative response, Simms was shortly thereafter forced to
abandon his experimentation. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 234.
12. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 525.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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nitrogen at -328 degrees fahrenheit. 16 Sperm that has been cryopre-
served for over ten years has still produced healthy children.' The
technology also exists to enable a sperm and egg to be united outside the
human body, thus creating a preembryo which could later be implanted
into the womb.'8 Preembryos can be frozen from between two to six
hundred years; therefore, a child may be conceived and/or born many
years after both its parents are deceased.' 9
Cryopreservation of sperm has gained widespread acceptance.20
Sperm banks have noted that activity greatly increases in times of war,
but there are also other reasons for the storage of sperm.2' These
include insurance against future infertility due to chemotherapy,
radiation treatment, vasectomy, or exposure to toxic substances.'
Additionally, as a result of sperm banks, unmarried women are afforded
an opportunity to conceive without having intercourse.' Approximate-
ly 170,000 women every year in the United States are artificially
inseminated using stored sperm.24 It has also been estimated that out
of those artificially inseminated, more than 65,000 resulting births occur
yearly.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION EXPLAINED
The artificial insemination procedure itself is quick and uncomplicat-
ed.26 It merely encompasses the donor sperm being injected into a
woman's vagina near her uterus by means of a syringe. 7 There are
three different forms of artificial insemination. Homologous artificial
insemination, commonly known as artificial insemination by husband
("AIH"), is a process by which, at the time of the woman's ovulation,
16. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 234.
17. Id.
18. Christine Djalleta, A Twinkle in the Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the
Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 335,335
(1994).
19. Id.
20. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 525.
21. Id.
22. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 235.
23. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 526.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. E. Donald Shapiro, New Innovations in Conception and Their Effects Upon Our Law
and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 41 (1986).
27. CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 58 (1989).
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she is inseminated using a syringe that contains her husband's semen.'
A second form of artificial insemination is called confused or combined
artificial insemination ("CA").29 In this procedure, the husband's
sperm, whose count may be low, is mixed with that of an anonymous
donor." The final form of artificial insemination is referred to as
heterologous insemination or artificial insemination by donor ("AI-
D").3 The donor is usually anonymous and is mandated to sign a
written waiver of all parental rights.32 This last form of artificial
insemination is increasingly utilized by unmarried women who want
children without the legal and emotional attachment to the child's
natural father.33
Ill. CASE LAW CONCERNING THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
PROCESS
An early interpretation of the legal ramifications of the artificial
insemination procedure held that the treating physician and the woman
committed adultery by participating in the process.34 This view was first
expressed by a Canadian court in the case of Orford v. Orford.35 The
Orford court commented that, the "essence of adultery" was "not in the
moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary
surrender to another person of the reproductive powers or faculties.,
36
This view was accepted by courts in the United States as evidenced
by the Illinois case of Doornbos v. Doornbos.37 Doornbos was a
divorce case in which the legitimacy of the child born via artificial
28. The husband's semen may have been deposited and frozen on a prior occasion.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 235.
29. Id. at 236.
30. Id. The advantages of this method are primarily psychological in nature. It provides
the husband with some basis for believing that he is indeed the natural father of the child.
Additionally, it may strengthen the legal presumption that the husband is the natural father
of a child born during the marriage.
31. Emily Patt, A Pathfinder on Artificial Insemination, 8 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES
Q. 117, 117-18 (1988).
32. Djalleta, supra note 18, at 349.
33. This form of artificial insemination is sometimes not without legal complications.
Sometimes a biological father who claims to want no attachment winds up desiring an
attachment. See generally Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology:
Seeking Aid in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524 (1994).
34. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 237.
35. 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
36. Id.
37. 139 N.E.2d 844 (II. Ct. App. 1956).
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insemination was at issue.3" Because the woman was not inseminated
by the sperm of her husband, the court found that the child was
illegitimate and therefore the husband was not the legal parent.39
After heightened criticism by the medical and legal community, the
notion that AID constituted adultery was abandoned.' However,
courts still disputed the proper legal status of the child.4' For example,
in Strnad v. Strnad,42 the New York court held that whether a child
born via the process of artificial insemination could be legitimate
depended on the circumstances. The court applied the analogy of a child
who is born out of wedlock and who becomes legitimate upon the
marriage of the parents, and stated that children in situations similar to
this (including an AID child) were in effect "potentially adopted or semi-
adopted."'43
In Gursky v. Gursky,44 also decided in New York, the court
determined that although the New York Legislature recognized the
practice of artificial insemination, the enacted statutes could not be
interpreted to render the resulting child legitimate. The Gursky court
rejected the Strnad decision because it claimed the decision did not rest
on any legal precedent and was unsupported by the current legislation.45
The court concluded that, according to settled law, a child conceived by
a father who was not the mother's husband was deemed illegitimate.'
The decisions of People v. Sorenson,47 and Adoption of Anony-
mous,48 demonstrate a more progressive approach toward an artificial
insemination child.49 In Sorenson, the issue before the court was
whether a father was guilty of violating the criminal penal code because
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Marci L. Smith, Book Note, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 709, 713 (reviewing CARMEL
SHALEV, BIRTH POWER (1989)).
41. Id.
42. 190 Misc. 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
43. Id. at 787-788.
44. 39 Misc. 2d 1083 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
45. Id. at 1087.
46. Id. at 1088. The Gursky court did, however, find the husband financially responsible
for the child by application of contract law. Here the court reasoned that because the husband
had consented to the AID, he made an implied promise to provide support for the child.
Additionally, the husband would be estopped from denying support of the child because the
wife had relied upon this promise to her own detriment. Id. at 1089.
47. 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968).
48. 74 Misc. 2d 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
49. Joseph Silvoso, Artificial Insemination: A Legislative Remedy, 3 W. ST. U. REV. 48,
60 (1975).
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he refused to support his child who was born via an artificial insemina-
tion process to which he had consented.50 The Sorenson court was the
first to find that a child conceived by artificial insemination during a
marriage was not the product of an adulterous relationship and the child
was presumed legitimate. 1 In establishing the legitimacy of the child,
the court stated that the "determinative factor is whether the legal
relationship of father and child exists."'52 The Sorenson court dismissed
any claims that the sperm donor should be considered the father of the
child by stating "the anonymous donor of sperm cannot be considered
the natural father as he is no more responsible for the use made of his
sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney."53 The court found there
was no natural father and therefore all that it needed to establish was
the lawful father.' The decision echoed numerous public policy
concerns as the court reasoned that labeling the child "illegitimate"
would serve no worthwhile public purpose.
5
Unlike the Sorenson decision, in Anonymous the court's decision
reached the broader issue of the child's legitimacy for purposes other
than support of the child.56 In Anonymous, a husband and wife
consented to AID, conceived, and the wife gave birth to a child.5 7 The
husband was listed on the birth certificate as the father of the child;
however, the couple later separated and the wife remarried.5 8 The new
husband sought to adopt the child and argued that consent of the prior
husband was not needed because the child was not legitimately his. 9
In reaching its decision, the Anonymous court looked to New York
case law.60 The court concluded the leading case in New York on this
issue was Gursky v. Gursky; however, the Anonymous court rejected the
Gursky decision because it was the only decision that "flatly [held] that
50. 437 P.2d. at 497-498.
51. Id. at 498.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court noted in dicta, "[t]he child is the principal party affected, and if he has
no father, he is forced to bear not only the handicap of social stigma but financial
deprivation." Despite this dicta, however, the Sorenson court limited its holding to a
determination of the husband's criminal liability for refusing to support his AID child. Id. at
499.
56. Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d at 100.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Id.
60. The court acknowledged Sorenson as pertinent but focused on New York policy. Id.
at 104.
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AID children are illegitimate. It [had] been criticized."'" The court
then reviewed New York policy and found there was a strong presump-
tion for legitimacy for AID children.62 The court primarily relied upon
the recent enactment of a Domestic Relations Law, that provided "a
child born of a void.., or voidable.. . marriage, even if the marriage
is deliberately and knowingly bigamous, incestuous or adulterous, is
legitimate and entitled to all the rights ... of a child born during a
perfectly valid marriage."'63 The Anonymous court therefore concluded
that it would be absurd to find a child born of a valid marriage
illegitimate when the parents consented and agreed to the impregnation
by artificial insemination.' The court stated that such a child was
"entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the
same marriage."'6
Courts have also dealt with issues regarding the rights of the donor
whose sperm was used to inseminate an unmarried woman. Representa-
tive is C.M. v. C.C.,66 a New Jersey case, in which an unmarried couple
desired to have a child but chose not to conceive by sexual intercourse.
In this case, a physician refused to aid the woman in her attempts to
conceive through artificial insemination, but by conversing with the
doctor, the couple learned and attempted the artificial insemination
procedure themselves.67 After a number of efforts, the couple was
successful.6" During C.C.'s pregnancy, however, the couple's relation-
ship terminated.69 C.M. still wanted to be acknowledged as the father
of the child and sought visitation rights on the basis that at the time of
the insemination it was his intention to act as the father.7'
The court found C.M.'s position analogous to a natural father of an
illegitimate child who is lawfully granted visitation rights.71 The court
phrased the issue as "whether a man is any less a father because he
provides the semen by a method different from that normally used,"72
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court determined that consent of the first husband was required in order for
the second husband to adopt the AID child. Id.
66. 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 822.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 824.
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and held that when a known donor intends to act as the father and the
intention is made known to the woman, he is indeed the legal father of
the child despite their marital status. 3 Like Sorenson, the court relied
in part on the public policy interests of a child having two parents
whenever possible.74
Another noteworthy case involving the artificial insemination of
unmarried women is the case of Loftin v. Flournoy,75 decided in the
California Superior Court. In this case, one partner of a lesbian couple
was inseminated with the semen of her lover's brother.7 6 Thus, one
partner was the biological mother and the other was the biological aunt
but desired to be considered the child's "legal" father.77 When the
child was about two years old, the couple separated and the lesbian
"father" had been ordered to pay monthly child support.78 Three years
later, the court granted the lesbian "father" standing to sue for visitation
rights, and it analogized the relationship to that of a "de facto psycholog-
ical parent."79
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO
PROCREATE
The legal status of a posthumous child necessarily involves the
examination of whether procreation by artificial insemination may be
considered a fundamental right. The Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of the right to procreate in Buck v. Bell.80 In Buck, the question
presented to the Court was whether a statute authorizing the sterilization
of feeble-minded individuals was constitutional.81 In this particular
case, Carrie Buck, the young woman at issue, was the institutionalized
daughter of a feeble-minded mother, also in the same institution, and
Carrie had given birth to an illegitimate feeble-minded child." In
finding it appropriate to sterilize Ms. Buck, the Court found, "It is better
73. Id. at 822.
74. Id. at 825. The court, however, did not entertain any notions of who would have
been the legal father if C.C. had married another man during the course of the pregnancy.
75. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1984, at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1984).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
81. Id. at 201. The statute in question stated that the health of the patient and the
betterment of society could be promoted in certain situations by the sterilization of mentally
defective individuals.
82. Id. at 205.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."8 3
The Supreme Court reversed its viewpoint less than twenty years
later in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.4 In Skinner, the Court
reviewed Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. Under the
Act, a habitual criminal was defined as a
person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes
"amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude," either in an
Oklahoma court or in a court of any other State, is thereafter
convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a
term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution.5
Under the Act, if an Oklahoma court found an individual to be a
habitual criminal, either a judge or jury could make the decision to
render the individual sexually sterile.8 6 The Petitioner in this case had
been convicted of three felonies and had been confined in the Oklahoma
state penitentiary 7 At the trial court level, a jury had determined that
the Petitioner was a habitual criminal and that the operation of a
vasectomy should be performed on him.8 This decision was affirmed
on appeal.8 9
In finding the Oklahoma Act unconstitutional, the United States
Supreme Court stated,
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the
law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.'
83. Id. at 207. The Court further proclaimed, "Three generations of imbeciles are
enough," and held that the statute was indeed constitutional.
84. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
85. Id. at 536.
86. Id.
87. The petitioner was convicted of stealing chickens, and twice of armed robbery. Id.
at 537.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 541.
1002 [Vol. 79:993
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The Court reviewed the application of the Act to various criminals and
indeed found its application arbitrary.91 This disparate treatment of
individuals caused the Court to find the Act unconstitutional based on
equal protection grounds.92
After Skinner, the right to privacy has been utilized as the basis for
finding unconstitutional a number of laws that interfered with an
individual's decisions concerning child-bearing.93 Griswold v. Connecti-
cut demonstrates the Court's expansion of the fundamental right to
privacy.9
4
In Griswold, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that made it
unlawful to use or distribute contraceptives.95 In finding this statute
unconstitutional, the Court recognized a fundamental right to privacy for
married individuals.96 To arrive at its decision, the Court reviewed
prior cases and determined that "the specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." 97 The Court reasoned that
"[t]he present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.""
It concluded that a law which forbade the use of contraceptives had a
destructive impact on this marital relationship.99 The Court therefore
held that such a law was overbroad and that it invaded constitutionally
91. Id.
92. Id. at 543.
93. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 532.
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. In Griswold, members of the medical profession had been found in violation of the
statute because they had provided "information, instruction, and medical advice to married
persons as a means of preventing conception." Id. at 480.
96. Id. at 485.
97. Id. at 484. The Court provided some examples of guarantees that have created zones
of privacy:
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in-its prohibition against the quartering
soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
Id.
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id.
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protected freedoms."°  In his final comments, Justice Douglas, who
wrote the majority opinion, stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble
a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.10'
For the Court, the prospect of police searching "the sacred precincts of
the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives"'"
was deemed "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital
relationship."'"
The Supreme Court again extended the right of privacy for procre-
ative decisions in Eisenstadt v. Baird."° In Eisenstadt, the defendant,
William Baird, was convicted for violating a statute that forbade
distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons.105 In reaching its
decision, the Court reviewed the legislative aims of the statute and
determined that its goals were to deter premarital sex and regulate the
distribution of potentially harmful articles, 6 and that enforcement of
this statute would "materially impair the ability of single persons to
obtain contraceptives."'"3 7 The Court questioned whether there was a
rational explanation for the difference in treatment between married and
unmarried persons under this statute, and concluded that there was
100. Id.
101. Id. at 486.
102. Id. at 485.
103. Id. at 485-860.
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. The statute in question read as follows: "[W]hoever ... gives away.., any drug,
medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception," except as
authorized in § 21A, "shall be punished by imprisonment in the state for not more than two
and one half years or be a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand
dollars." Under § 21A,
[a] registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs
or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [And a]
registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such
drugs or articles to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered
physician.
Id. at 440-41.
106. Id. at 443.
107. Id. at 446.
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none.08 In its final comments the Court stated, "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.' '109
In Carey v. Population Services International,"0 the Court integrated
the holdings of both Griswold and Eisenstadt and recognized as
fundamental the individual's right to make procreative decisions. The
statute involved in this case forbade the distribution of contraceptives to
anyone under age 16, and prohibited distribution to anyone over 16 by
anyone other than licensed pharmacist."' The Court reviewed prior
caselaw and stated, "the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution
protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified
intrusion by the State.""'
Considered together, the holdings of the Court in Skinner, Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Carey affirmatively support the existence of the funda-
mental right of the individual, whether married or single, to make
procreative choices."' A restriction of this right is only deemed
constitutional when there is a compelling state interest and the Court has
strictly scrutinized such interests to make sure that a statute "'is narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.""'"
Arguably, this fundamental right to make procreative choices should
include the ability to make decisions about the specific method of
conception. The Carey decision is supportive of this in that the Carey
Court implied that access to contraceptives is vital to the ability to
exercise one's constitutionally protected right in matters concerning
childbearing."' It is therefore additionally arguable that "access to the
artificial methods of conception is also essential to the exercise of the
108. Id. at 443.
109. Id. at 453.
110. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
111. Id. at 681.
112. Id. at 687. The Court clarified that the test for determining whether state
restrictions that inhibit the privacy rights of minors are valid is whether or not they serve "any
significant state interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult." Id. at 693. The Court
found that although the states have more latitude to regulate the conduct of children, there
was no significant state interest involved here. Id.
113. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 534.
114. 431 U.S. at 688 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
115. Id. at 693.
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constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing and
thus, restrictions on such access should also be strictly scrutinized. 116
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly addressed whether
the fundamental right to make procreative decisions includes the
utilization of new reproductive methods, at least one federal district
court has done so." 7 Additionally, at least three state courts have been
indirectly affirmative on this issue.'
In Lifchez v. Hartigan,' the Northern District of Illinois consid-
ered whether a provision of the Illinois Abortion Law involving fetal
experimentation was unconstitutional.Y After reviewing the implica-
tions of the statute, the court held that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague because of its failure to define key terms.12 1 More importantly,
however, the court also found the statute unconstitutional because it
violated a woman's fundamental right to privacy," "in particular, her
right to make reproductive choices free of governmental interference
with those choices."'' In concluding, the court exclaimed: "It takes
no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally
protected choices that includes the right to have access to contraceptives,
there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a
medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnan-
cy."512 4
Two California decisions and a Tennessee case are also supportive of
the view that the right of privacy includes the right to access new
reproductive technologies for procreative purposes. In Johnson v.
116. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 535-36.
117. See infra note 119.
118. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 536.
119. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
120. The statute provided as follows:
No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertilization of a
human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the
fetus thereby produced. Intentional violation of this section is a Class A misdemean-
or. Nothing in this subsection is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro
fertilization.
Id. at 1363.
121. Without a clear definition of the meaning of either "experiment" or "therapeutic",
the court stated it was not possible for the plaintiff, who represented doctors specializing in
reproductive endocrinology and fertility counseling, to know which of the many procedures
he administered were forbidden. Id. at 1363.
122. Id. at 1376.
123. Id. Such choices included both embryo transfer and chorionic villi sampling. Id.
at 1377.
124. Id. at 1377.
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Calvert,"s a case that involved a surrogacy contract, the court stated:
"It is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive
technology when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort
would raise serious questions in light of the fundamental nature of the
rights of procreation and privacy."" In Hecht v. Superior Court,27
the court echoed the Johnson court and utilized this finding to afford a
decedent's girlfriend the right to his frozen sperm."2
Lastly in Davis v. Davis,29 a case that involved the future outcome
of embryos that were conceived through in vitro fertilization, the
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded:
[H]owever far the protection of procreational autonomy extends,
the existence of the right itself dictates that decisional authority
rests in the gamete-providers alone, at least to the extent that
their decisions have an impact upon their individual reproductive
status .... [No other person or entity has an interest sufficient
to permit interference with the gamete-providers' decision to
continue or terminate the IVF process, because no one else bears
the consequences of these decisions in the way that the gamete-
providers do. 3°
The Davis decision thus supports the existence of a fundamental right to
procreative choices regarding reproductive technology, and it implies a
fundamental right to noncoital (non-intercourse) reproduction.'
V. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW CONCERNING POSTHUMOUS
CONCEPTION
To date, very few cases have dealt with posthumous conception
issues, but the event which first generated concern about the state of the
law in this area occurred in Melbourne, Australia in 1983.13 In 1983,
Mario and Elsa Rios (husband and wife), both participants in a frozen
125. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
126. Id. at 787.
127. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Id. at 290.
129. 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
130. Id. at 602.
131. See Gilbert, supra note 11, at 537. It should be noted, however, that the Davis
court found that there could also be a fundamental right not to procreate. In Davis, the
frozen embryos were awarded to the ex-husband who chose not to be a father. See Jennifer
L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing
Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 523, 525 (1994).
132. Brown, et. al, supra note 6, at 666.
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embryo artificial insemination program, were killed in a plane crash.133
The couple's death caused two frozen embryos to be thrown into a legal
quagmire because neither of the parents' wills mentioned the distribution
of the embryos.13 1
The law in Australia was unprepared to answer the legal questions
of whether the embryos possessed any inheritance rights and whether the
estate possessed any rights to control the outcome of the embryos. 135
The State of Victoria empaneled a blue-ribbon committee to decide the
fate of the preembryos. 3 6 This panel concluded that the preembryos
possessed no legal rights or claims to inheritance, and because the
parents had not explicitly provided for the outcome of the preembryos,
they should be destroyed.'37 This decision was met with animosity by
both the Australian ight-to-life movement and the Catholic Church and
the matter was put before the Victoria legislature. 38 The legislature
abandoned the panel's recommendation and enacted a law preserving the
preembryos for implantation into a surrogate.1 39 The Attorney Gener-
al of the State of Victoria, however, declared that because the pre-
embryos had no legal status, any resulting child would be that of the
surrogate mother and her husband. As such, they would not have any
right to inherit from the estate.14°
A. Parpalaix
Parpalaix v. CECOS41 involved the situation of a young man who
had stored sperm because of a terminal illness.142  In 1981, Alain
Parpalaix, then age twenty-four, had been diagnosed with testicular
cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy. His doctor told him that the
133. See James Lieber, The Case of the Frozen Embryos, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
October 1989, at 50.
134. Approximately ninety women volunteered to be impregnated with the Rios
embryos, (perhaps with the hope of sharing in the division of the estate proceeds), and the
event forced the estate into chaos. See Brown, et. al, supra note 6, at 666.
135. Laura Heard, A Time to be Born, A Time to Die: Alternative Reproduction and
Texas Probate Law, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 927, 928 (1986).
136. Brown, et. al, supra note 6, at 690.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Lieber, supra note 133.
140. This situation proved to be a warning sign for the legal profession across the world
that the science of fertility manipulation had created many unresolved issues in the area of
wills and estates. See Heard, supra note 135, at 928.
141. Trib. gr. inst. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, Sept. 15, 1984, at 11, cited in
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 229.
142. Id.
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chemotherapy would leave him sterile.43 In December of that year,
Alain made a sperm deposit at the Centre d'Etude et de Conservation
du Sperme (CECOS), a government supported research center and
sperm bank; however, Alain left no instructions with the center regarding
what to do with the sperm.'" The sperm was kept at CECOS in a
frozen state in liquid nitrogen at -321 degrees fahrenheit for over two
years. 45
At the time Alain donated the sperm in 1981, he was residing in
Marseilles with a woman named Corrine Richard."4 The couple was
not married at the time; however, when Alain's cancer worsened, the two
were married in 1983 in a hospital ceremony.47 Alain died two days
later, on Christmas, at the age of 26.1
Corrine Parpalaix asked for Alain's sperm deposit from CECOS.
The center's procedures, however, did not allow them to return the
sperm to her.'49 CECOS denied her request and informed her that the
law did not require CECOS to give the sperm to her but that rather the
sperm now belonged to them.5 ° The center did instruct Corrine to
obtain a legal determination from the Ministry of Health, which had held
in the past that both the husband and wife must consent to artificial
insemination and implied that both parties must be alive.' The
Ministry chose not to resolve Corrine's issue and told her it would decide
at a later date.152 Corrine decided to pursue the matter in court. 53
Corrine, together with Alain's parents, filed suit."M They based
their claim initially on contract theory.55 They argued that as natural
heirs, they were now the owners of Alain's sperm and CECOS had
breached its contract by not returning the sperm to. them. 56 Corrine
143. Sabine Mauboache, Life After Death; French Woman Wins Sperm Bank Decision,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1984 at B1.
144. Id.
145. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 230.
146. Id.
147. See E.J. Dionne Jr., Widow Wins Paris Case for Husband's Sperm, N.Y. TIMES,
August 2, 1984, at A9.
148. Id.
149. See Awarding the Seeds of Life, TIME, August 13, 1984, at 35.
150. Dionne, supra note 147.
151. E.J. Dionne, French Widow Sues over Sperm, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1984, at A7.
152. See France: Love in Legal No Man's Land, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1984, at 44.
153. Id.
154. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 230.
155. Id.
156. Id. As support for their argument, they relied on Article 1939 of the French Civil
Code, which governed contracts of deposit of material goods in general and provided, "[I]n
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and Alain's parents also testified that it was Alain's intent to leave the
sperm to Corrine, and for her to conceive after his death.157
CECOS also had several arguments. It first contended that its only
obligation was to the donor, rather than Corrine, and consequently under
a traditional deposit agreement, the sperm was not returnable to a
natural heir.'58 CECOS also claimed that the sperm was an indivisible
part of the body, much like an arm or leg or organ of the body, and was
thus not inheritable without express instructions from the donor.'59
CECOS also argued that at the time of the deposit, Alain was unmarried
and gave no specific request for the sperm, so his intentions at that point
were ambiguous.' 6 The center concluded that since his intentions at
the time of his death were also inexplicit, the sperm should not be turned
over.' 6' Lastly, CECOS claimed that Alain's deposit of the sperm was
solely for therapeutic purposes done in an attempt to aid him psychologi-
cally. 62 The center stated that artificial insemination is exercised
merely to surmount the male's insecurity in dealing with sterility."6'
But giving birth, they argued, is not within the realm of this therapy and
would cause a variety of unwanted abuses to their procedures as a sperm
bank2 4
In its opinion, the Tribunal de grand instance first addressed and
described the obstacles that French laws governing inheritance rights and
illegitimacy would impose upon a child born after the death of a man
such as Alain.' 6 Under the French Civil Code, any child born more
than 300 days after the father's death is considered illegitimate."6
Even if the code could be construed more liberally and paternity could
somehow be recognized, another section of the code states that to
inherit, the child must be in existence at the time of the death, and the
the case of death of the person who made the bailment, the thing bailed may be returned only
to the heir.... [I]f the thing bailed is indivisible, the heirs must agree among themselves in
order to receive it." Id. Under this view, the sperm was to be considered a movable object
or property and therefore could be inherited. Id.
157. Id. at 230-31.
158. See Maubouche, supra note 143.
159. Id.
160. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 230-31.
161. See Maubouche, supra note 143.
162. Id.
163. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 230-31.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Maubouche, supra note 143.
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code expressly disqualified a child not yet conceived. 67 Although the
court offered no solutions to circumvent these laws, it did seem to imply
that the laws were outdated and in need of revision.'"
The simple solution to the problem might have been to apply the
contract principles argued by both sides; however, the court refused to
do so. 169  Instead, the court found that human sperm could not be
characterized as a movable and inheritable property within the meaning
of the French Civil Code.70 The code was therefore found inapplica-
ble.71
The court went on and described the sperm as "the seed of
life... tied to the fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or
not to conceive."'" This fundamental right, the court stated, should be
zealously. protected and not governed by the rules of contracts." The
court enunciated that the outcome of the sperm must be determined by
the person from whom it was taken. 74 After taking all facts into
account, the court determined Alain's intent was to have Corrine bear
his child.'75
B. Hecht
The Parpalaix decision, although not legally binding precedent,
played a role in Hecht v. Superior Court,76 a case decided in the
California Supreme Court. Hecht revolved around the saga of an
eccentric man named William Kane who had committed suicide in a Las
Vegas Hotel.'" For approximately five years prior to his death, he had
been living with Deborah Hecht, and was also survived by his two
children and ex-wife. In October of 1991, the decedent, in anticipation
167. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 231-232.
168. Id. at 232.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Margot Slade & Carlyle C. Douglas, Widow's Chance to Conceive, N. Y. TIMES,
August 5, 1984, § 4, at 7.
174. Id.
175. Unfortunately, Corrine was unsuccessful in her attempts to impregnate herself with
her deceased husband's sperm. See Widows Fails to Conceive with Mate's Sperm, L.A. TIMES,
January 11, 1985, at 2. This was due to the sperm's poor quality and small quantity. Shapiro
& Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 233.
176. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
177. Although the facts of the Hecht situation are recited in the case, numerous
newspaper articles reported the saga in great detail. See, e.g., Carla Hall, A Legacy of
Litigation; Can Sperm Be Bequeathed?, L.A. TIMES, November 10, 1994, at El.
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of eventually committing suicide, deposited 15 vials of his sperm in the
California Cryobank, Inc., a Los Angeles sperm bank. He executed
various contracts and wrote letters that demonstrated his intent to have
Deborah Hecht bear his child subsequent to his planned suicide.78
After the suicide, Kane's two children contested the will and pursued
the matter in probate court. 79  The children claimed that if the
September 27, 1991, will were invalid, they were entitled to one hundred
percent of Kane's frozen sperm. 8 0  Hecht argued that the children
possessed no property interest in the sperm and that the sperm had been
gifted to her at the time it was deposited. 8' She also claimed that
denying her access to Kane's sperm would impinge on her constitutional
178. Kane signed a "Specimen Storage Agreement" on September 24, 1991, in which he
requested the following, "I, William Kane .... authorize the [sperm bank] to release my semen
specimens (vials) to Deborah Ellen Hecht. I am also authorizing specimens to be released to
recipient's physician, Dr. Kathryn Moyer." 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 276.
On September 27, 1991, the decedent executed a will that was filed with the Los Angeles
County Superior Court and forwarded to probate. The will named Deborah Hecht as the
executor of the estate and provided as follows, "I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I
may have in any specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for
storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht." Id.
Additionally, another section of the will entitled "Statement of Wishes" contained the
following provision:
It being my intention that samples of my sperm will be stored at a sperm bank for
the use of Deborah Ellen Hecht, should she so desire, it is my wish that should
[Hecht] become impregnated with my sperm, before or after my death, she disregard
the wishes expressed in Paragraph 3 above [pertaining to disposition of decedent's
"diplomas and frames mementoes,"] to the extent that she wishes to preserve any or
all of my mementoes and diplomas and the like for our future child or children.
Id. at 277.
Finally, in October 1991, just prior to his suicide, William Kane wrote a letter which he
addressed to his two children:
I address this to my children, because, although I have only two, Everett and
Katy, it may be that Deborah will decide - as I hope she will - to have a child by
me after my death. I've been assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for that
eventuality. If she does, then this letter is for my posthumous offspring, as well, with
the thought that I have loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you
born .... If you are receiving this letter, it means I am dead - whether by my own
hand or that of another makes very little difference.
Id.
179. Id. at 276.
180. The children intended to destroy the sperm because they did not want any half-
siblings to be born who would degradate the integrity of their family as they knew it at the
time of their father's death. They also requested that the sperm be destroyed on public policy
grounds because a child born after his father's death would not know his natural father. Id.
at 281.
181. Id. at 282.
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right to procreate.'2 The trial court found for the children and
ordered that the sperm be destroyed.'"
Hecht then appealed the matter to the California Court of Ap-
peal." On appeal the court first had to decide whether the sperm was
the decedent's property at the time of his death and capable of
testamentary distribution." After reviewing pertinent case law, the
court focused on the right to procreate and held,
[t]he decedent's interest in his frozen sperm vials, even if not
governed by the general law of personal property, occupies "an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life" ... and at the time of death,
decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the
extent that he had decisionmaking authority as to the sperm
within the scope of policy set by law.8 6
The court further noted, "[w]e are aware of only one other court which
has addressed the issue of the right of a woman to the sperm of a
decedent .... [W]e find the Parpalaix case instructive and pertinent to
the issue before us although it dealt with a married couple."'" Citing
Parpalaix, the court stated, "Rather the fate of the sperm must be
decided by the person from whom it is drawn. Therefore, the sole issue
becomes that of intent."' 8  The court was also persuaded by the
reasoning of Davis v. Davis,89 in that the Davis court had found an
interest in preembryos that was "an interest in the nature of ownership
because of its potential for becoming human life."' '
Following the reasoning of Parpalaix and Davis, the Hecht court held
that Kane was entitled to will the sperm to Hecht and, provided she
182. Id.
183. See John Hiscock, Court Battle over Suicide Man's Sperm, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
December 12, 1992, at 12.
184. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280.
185. Id. The children argued that Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990) controlled on this issue. In Moore, the California Supreme Court held that
a man whose cells were removed for hairy-cell leukemia treatment did not retain the
ownership interest in his cells, because the plaintiff had no expectation to retain possession of
his cells after they were excised. The Hecht court distinguished Moore from the case at bar
because Kane did possess an expectation of control over his sperm after he deposited it at the
sperm bank. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d at 281 n.4.
186. Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 287.
188. Id. at 288.
189. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
190. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (citing 842 S.W.2d at 597.)
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could establish his intent to do so, the sperm belonged to her.'9' The
court also noted that according to California law there was no public
policy in existence which made it wrongful for an unmarried woman to
utilize donor sperm to conceive."9 Rather, it was found that single
women could be artificially inseminated and that concerns about the
protection of offspring and psychological trauma for existing children
were inconsequential when compared to the overriding protection of the
fundamental right to procreate even via posthumous reproduction.93
The Hecht court then remanded the case to the trial court to determine
the true intent of the decedent regarding the distribution of the
sperm.
194
Both the Parpalaix and Hecht cases indicate that the courts will
protect the right to procreate via artificial insemination and that sperm
is inheritable and has a special status because of its potential for human
life. It is also evident that if the intent of the decedent can be sufficient-
ly established, the sperm will be returned to its intended donee or to the
natural heir as part and parcel of the fundamental right to procreate. It
is intriguing to note that in both Parpalaix and Hecht the courts, because
of absence of pertinent legislation, had to attempt to make the situations
fit into some legal derivation of contract law.' 95 As neither contract
law nor personal property law seemed an appropriate fit, the courts
necessarily had to intertwine concepts of the fundamental right to
procreate. Neither area, or even the combination of the areas is, at this
time, a perfect fit by which subsequent courts might obtain guidance in
resolution of similar issues.
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION AND POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
No state had legislation on artificial insemination until about the mid-
1960s; 96 however, currently, thirty five states have implemented laws
to regulate some aspect of the artificial insemination process."
Typically, states regulate who may perform the insemination and who
191. Id. at 290.
192. Id. at 289.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 291.
195. See also York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); Del Zio v. Columbia
Presbyterian Medical Ctr., No. 74-3558, slip. op. (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
196. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 239.
197. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 527.
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may donate the sperm. 9 ' About fourteen states have adopted some
version of the Uniform Parentage Act (U.P.A.) 9 9 of which Section 5
provides:
(a) If under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated with semen donated
by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived....
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use
in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father
of a child thereby conceived.'
Most states adopting this provision of the U.P.A. require the written
consent of both the husband and wife to allow the artificial insemination
procedure to be undertaken, and provide that the husband will be
deemed the legal father.20' These states typically provide protection
to the sperm donor from the obligations of parenthood and protect the
donee from the donor's claim of rights to parenthood.2 This is done
by extinguishing all rights and responsibilities of parenthood in the donor
and vesting them in the donee's husband.'
The statutes regulating the artificial insemination process are,
however, deficient in many respects. For instance, these statutes focus
only on situations involving married donees and fail to address unmar-
ried donees. 4 Those state statutes in which the word "married" is not
deleted' 5 may be interpreted as prohibiting artificial insemination by
unmarried women because the statute does not expressly authorize it; at
the very least such statutes can be said to discourage unmarried women
from artificial insemination because there is a possibility that the donor
can assert his parental rights to the child.2° Unmarried women may
also be dissuaded from utilization of artificial insemination because of
198. Djalleta, supra note 18, at 339.
199. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 528 n.37.
200. Id. at 530.
201. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 240.
202. Michael Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human
Artificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295 § 2[a] (1994).
203. Id.
204. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 9, at 240.
205. Nine states have eliminated the "married" designation: California, Colorado,
Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See Gilbert, supra
note 11, at 528-29 n.37.
206. Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A
Call For an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 19 (1981).
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their fear that the child will be deemed illegitimate at law since the
statutes only clearly recognize the AID child of a married couple as
legitimate.' Although commentators have suggested that the absence
of "unmarried women" from most of the statutes was not intended to
prohibit their use of the procedure,"' without direct statutory inclu-
sion or exclusion, numerous legal problems will invariably arise
associated with unmarried women who artificially inseminate. The
statutes also ignore the complications involved in situations where gay,
lesbian or other individuals artificially inseminate and wish to preclude
the future assertion of parental rights. By apparently dealing only with
the rights of married couples, the provisions of the U.P.A. arguably do
not encompass, or, at the very least, ignore fundamental rights relating
to procreation as delineated by the United States Supreme Court and
other lower courts.
Similarly, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA) ignores technological, if not judicial developments. While
the Act is somewhat broader than the U.P.A. in that it contemplates
surrogate contracts and participation of unmarried women in the artificial
insemination process, it still appears only to contemplate sorting out the
rights of parties who choose surrogacy or artificial insemination in a
marital context.20 9
In regard to legislation concerning postmortem insemination
specifically, the law is severely underdeveloped.210 Although the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act contemplates the
use of postmortem insemination, only two states, Virginia and North
Dakota, have adopted the Act, and there is only one provision relating
to postmortem children.2" Section 4(b) of this Act provides, "an
individual who dies before.., a child is conceived other than through
sexual intercourse, using the individual's ... sperm, is not a parent of the
resulting child., 212
207. Id.
208. See Gilbert, supra note 11, at 530.
209. The definition of "assisted conception" (§1(1)) does not make reference to married
or unmarried, but the remaining provisions of the Act do not settle any of the dilemmas left
unanswered under the UPA.
210. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 527.
211. Id. at 528-29.
212. Id. at 529 n.38. The comment to the section illustrates that the primary purpose was
to "avoid the problems of intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a
person's genetic material could lead to the deceased being termed a parent. Of course, those
who want to explicitly provide for such children in their wills may do so." UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AcT § 4(b) (1993), quoted in Gilbert, supra note 11, at
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This section does no more to recognize technological and judicial
realities than does the U.TA. For instance, the section does not
satisfactorily address the status of the child born to the widow via the
artificial insemination process. One can argue that the child should be
legitimate because her husband made the deposit of sperm during the
marriage and thus the widow will have been inseminated with her
husband's sperm. One can also argue that the child should not be
considered legitimate because the husband is now deceased, the marriage
terminated, and at the time of the actual insemination, the widow will
have been inseminated with the semen of a man not her husband.213
It appears more likely that unless the widow remarries, she is for all
practical purposes unmarried and therefore her situation parallels that
of an unmarried woman who uses AID to have a child, leaving status
and rights in an ambiguous vacuum.214 Additionally, the Act does not
address situations, like Hecht, where the woman requesting the sperm is
not the wife of the decedent but rather the girlfriend.215
Medical technology, in tandem with decisions concerning the
fundamental right to procreate, demonstrate that legislatures thus far
have been deficient in adequately addressing legitimacy issues and the
inheritance rights of the posthumous child. While the easiest course of
conduct might be for legislatures to adopt the USCACA provision giving
the posthumous child no inheritance rights, this would be in direct
conflict both with the reality of the changing family structure and with
firmly established constitutional rights.
Griswold made clear that there exists a fundamental right of privacy,
and Eisenstadt clarified that this right was not just limited to married
persons. In the face of advancements in reproductive technology, courts
have had to tailor the constitutional protection to encompass not only
freedom of choice in contraceptive method, but also conception method.
Hecht and Parpalaix made evident that issues of reproductive capability
529 n.38.
Virginia's version of this section is modified somewhat and states the following:
Any person who dies before in utero implantation of an embryo resulting from the
union of his sperm or her ovum with another gamete, whether or nor the other
gamete is that of the person's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting child
unless... (ii) the person consents to be a parent in writing executed before the
implantation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B) quoted in Gilbert, supra note 11, at 529.
213. See generally Gilbert, supra note 11, at 530.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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were not adequately addressed by general property and contract
principles because of the fundamental rights associated with the life-
giving potential of frozen reproductive gametes. 216
Despite technology that is advancing rather than regressing,
legislatures tend to be locked in a Griswold era perspective that overtly
extends protection and gives guidelines only in mainstream family
situations. 217 Moreover, the USCACA lends little assistance as it cuts
off the inheritance rights of the posthumous child all together,2 18
simplifying the system to fit into antiquated legal property concepts
while, in many respects, threatening the fundamental right of a woman
(albeit a widow) to bear the child of her husband.21 9
While the capacity for posthumous reproduction in a variety of family
or non-family situations has the capacity to toss the plodding legal world
into a quagmire of possibilities to sort out, appropriate legislation is not
as difficult as it seems.' Certainly, exempting the posthumous child of
the widow from illegitimacy would be a step toward ensuring a
legislatively preserved right to choose reproductive technologies, and
would not even fly in the face of theoreticians who believe the right of
privacy (including the fundamental right to procreate) extends only to
married persons. Moreover, even a recognition of the unmarried woman
in artificial insemination legislation would go far in clearing up where the
legislature stands on the rights of unmarried persons.
One expressed fear is that postmortem children might be able to
claim part of the decedent's estate and thereby indefinitely delay its final
administration; 221  however, this fear should encourage proactivity
rather than inhibit it. There are some portions of already existing
legislation that should be studied as models for more current legislation.
For instance, under the Uniform Probate Code, there is a four-year time
216. See also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Family Law: Alternative Means of Reproduc-
tion: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (1984).
217. But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131 (West 1993) which provides that disputes
involving pre-embryos are to be resolved in "the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum."
218. This is not true in Virginia where a provision in the will may provide for a
posthumous child. VA. CODE ANN. 20-158 (1993).
219. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 21208 (1993). The historical notes to this statute
acknowledge that the posthumous child of a widow may be denied inheritance rights and the
status of a posthumous child "has not yet been resolved."
220. In 1972, Winthrop D. Thies proposed the Uniform Rights of Posthumously
Conceived Child Act. See Winthrop D. Thies, A Look to the Future: Property Rights and the
Posthumously Conceived Child, TR. & EST., November 1971, at 922.
221. Djalleta, supra note 18, at 368.
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limitation on claims against an estate.' Additionally, under the
Uniform Parentage Act, an action to establish parentage must be
brought within three years after the child's birth or within three years
after the child attains the age of majority, (if the child brings the
action).' This statute does not at all affect the inheritance potential
of the posthumous child and could be modified to include specific
reference to legitimizing the posthumous child. These statutes, more
appropriate than principles of contract law, can be the basis for statutes
that recognize changing technologies and minimize the complexities of
the ambiguous, inconsistent policies currently in place. Legislation need
not contemplate every possible posthumous child scenario, but it must
do more to address existing situations.
CONCLUSION
Artificial insemination, alternative reproductive methods, and the
types of new family relationships are areas in which the law is falling far
behind the realities of technology and the world at large. Although the
development of law has traditionally been reactive as opposed to
proactive, there have been enough signals to indicate that unless
proactive measures are taken legislatively, there will soon be a quagmire
of legal complexities revolving around reproductive technologies that our
state probate and domestic relations courts will have to sort out. Cases
involving the artificial insemination process have been before the courts
for over seventy years. Each court has been required to fashion its
finding by at times interweaving inappropriate legal concepts that tend
to resolve the issue before it but provide no overall guidance for the
future.
The Supreme Court has made clear that a fundamental right to
procreate exists, and it is on the basis of this right that courts have found
that the "seeds of life" are more than mere property capable of
testamentary distribution through standard contract principles.
Currently, the legal status of the posthumous child is as uncertain as the
definitive circumstances in which a posthumous child is allowed to be
born. As medical technology advances, the law must do the same and
promptly confront the issues of the posthumous child through legislation.
222. Id. at 369.
223. Id. at 368.
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